HAVENO Exchange Security
Security model
Multisignature escrow, security deposits, Tor transport, and what happens when a trade goes wrong.
Security model
Haveno's design starts from an uncomfortable assumption: you and your trading peer do not trust each other, and neither of you should have to trust the software vendor either. Everything below follows from that.
What Haveno never has
- Your keys. The wallet is created and stored on your machine. There is no server-side copy to steal or subpoena.
- Your funds. Monero moves between your wallet, a shared multisignature address, and your peer. It never sits in an account the project controls.
- Your identity. There is no registration, so there is no identity database to leak.
What that costs you
Self-custody means the failure modes are yours as well. Lose the seed phrase and nobody can restore the wallet. Confirm a payment you did not receive and the escrow will release. Run a tampered binary and none of the guarantees hold. The trade-off is deliberate, but it is a real one.
Deposits, not trust
Both sides lock a refundable deposit, so walking away from a trade costs something.
Settlement stays direct
The non-Monero side moves peer-to-peer. Haveno records that you confirmed it, not the money itself.
Multisig escrow
During a trade, the Monero sits in a 2-of-3 multisignature address. Three keys exist — yours, your peer's, and the arbitrator's — and any two of them together can move the funds.
The normal path
Nothing unusual happens in a trade that goes well. The seller's XMR and both security deposits go into the shared address. The buyer sends the other side of the trade directly. When the seller confirms receipt, the two peers' keys sign together, the buyer receives the XMR, and each deposit returns to the peer who posted it. The arbitrator's key is never used.
Why two of three
A 2-of-2 escrow would let either side freeze the funds forever simply by refusing to sign. A single-key escrow would mean trusting whoever held that key. Two of three lets the peers settle on their own while still leaving a route out when one of them disappears or lies — without ever giving the third party unilateral control.
The arbitrator alone cannot move anything. Their key is only useful in combination with one of the two peers, which is what keeps the arrangement non-custodial even during a dispute.
Tor and privacy
Haveno's peer connections run over Tor. Peers reach each other through onion routing rather than by connecting to an address you control, so taking an offer does not hand the other side your IP address.
What Tor protects
- Your network location from your trading peer.
- Your network location from anyone observing the offer book.
- The fact that you are running Haveno at all from a passive observer on your local network.
What it does not protect
Tor covers the transport. It does not cover what you tell your peer. If the payment method attaches your legal name to a bank transfer, your peer learns your name — that is a property of the method, not of the network. Choose payment methods with that in mind, and treat the details you send as permanently disclosed to the person on the other end.
Disputes
If a trade stalls — a peer stops responding, or the two of you disagree about whether payment arrived — either side can raise a dispute.
The arbitrator reviews what each peer submitted and then signs together with whichever side is owed the funds, using the third key. That is the whole role: they resolve a deadlock between two people who cannot agree, and they can never move funds on their own.
Keep whatever your payment method gives you as evidence — transfer references, timestamps, confirmations. A dispute is decided on what each side can show.